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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case concerns when a party attempting to establish ownership over real property by 
adverse possession has a vested interest in the subject property. Appellants Donald Schoorl and 
Sonia Schoorl on behalf of the Donald and Sonia Schoorl Trust ult/a March 2, 2015 
("Appellants"), contend a party has a vested interest in real property on the date they commence 
adversely possessing the property. Respondent Guild Mortgage Company1 ("Respondent") 
contends the property right acquired by adverse possession is vested once the party meets the 
statutory requirements for adverse possession, which may be modified by the Idaho Legislature 
at any point before the property right is vested. 
In this case, when Appellants began adversely possessing the property at issue (the 
"Property"), the statute required an adverse possession for a period of five (5) years before the 
property right vested. Before Appellants adversely possessed the subject property for five years, 
the Idaho Legislature extended the period to establish a property right by adverse possession to 
twenty (20) years. The Idaho Legislature changed the period to establish a right in real property 
by adverse possession before Appellants acquired a vested ownership right in the Property. 
Appellants incorrectly argue that since they started adversely possessing the Property 
when the statute only required five years of adverse possession, the amendment extending the 
time period could not extend to them. Appellants are wrong. Statutes are deemed to apply 
retroactively when the statute is applied in a manner that affects vested or already existing rights. 
The District Court held Appellants were required to adversely possess the Property for 20 years 
1 Respondent is not the owner of the property at issue in this case, but has standing to object to Appellants adverse 
possession. Appellants seek to seize title by adverse possession to a strip of land that is encumbered by a Deed of 
Trust, recorded as Instrument No. 2010024387, which secures a promissory note payable to Respondent. R. Vol. I, 
p. 25. Appellants' adverse possession claim impacts Respondent's rights under the Deed of Trust. 
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before Appellants acquired a right in the Property and properly dismissed Appellants' Complaint 
and Petition to Quiet Title. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Respondent generally agrees with the course of proceedings as stated by Appellants. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Respondent generally agrees with the facts as stated by Appellants. Respondent 
disagrees with one factual assertion by Appellants, namely that Appellants "purchased and have 
been in possession of the property since 2001 .... " (Appellants' Brief, p. 2.) Respondent 
disputes that Appellants ever purchased the Property. However, whether or not Appellants 
purchased the Property is not relevant for this appeal, which focuses on the adverse possession 
claim asserted by Appellants and the applicable statutory period of limitations. 
II. RESTATED ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondent restates the issues on appeal as follows: 
A. Did the district court err in determining that the Appellants were required to adversely 
possess the Property for twenty (20) years in order to quiet title to the Property? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards of Review. 
In reviewing a grant ofa motion to dismiss, this Court's standard of review is the same as 
the district court's standard in ruling upon a summary judgment motion. All facts and inferences 
from the record will be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party to determine whether the motion 
should be granted. Rim View Trout Co. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 119 Idaho 676, 677, 809 
P.2d 1155, 1156 (1991) (citing Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986); Anderson 
v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658,651 P.2d 923 (1982); Farmer's Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Brown, 97 Idaho 
380, 544 P.2d 1150 (1976)). 
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"This Court exercises free review over questions of law." Fuller v. Callister, 150 Idaho 
848, 851, 252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011). This Court also exercises "free review over matters of 
statutory interpretation." KGF Dev., LLC v. City of Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524, 527, 236 P.3d 
1284, 1287 (2010) (quoting State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326,327,208 P.3d 730, 731 (2009)). "The 
interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If 
the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as 
written."' Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P .3d 502, 506 
(2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)). 
B. Analysis. 
1. Appellants Did Not Acquire Any Real Property Rights in the Property Prior 
to July 1, 2006. 
The issue on appeal boils down to one simple question, whether or not Appellants 
acquired a vested real property right in the Property as of July 1, 2006. If Appellants did not 
have a vested right in the Property prior to July 1, 2006, the amendment to the adverse 
possession statutes would not affect any vested rights of Appellants. The District Court correctly 
held Appellants did not have any vested rights in the Property as of July 1, 2006, and therefore 
the amendment to the statutory period of adverse possession necessary to acquire a property right 
by adverse possession governed Appellants' quiet title action. 
Prior to July 1, 2006, a person could acquire a real property ownership right by adversely 
possessing real property for five years and meeting the other requirements of Idaho Code § 5-
210.2 It is undisputed that Appellants had not adversely possessed the Property for five years as 
2 The District Court and the parties in the proceeding below focused on the amendment to Idaho Code § 5-203. See, 
e.g., R. Vol I, pp. 79-82. However, that statute governs ejectrnent actions. Idaho Code § 5-2 IO governs quiet title 
actions brought by the adverse possessor. See Deer Creek, Inc. v. Hibbard, 94 Idaho 533,534,493 P.2d 392, 393 
3 
of July 1, 2006. The statute was amended effective July 1, 2006, to require an adverse 
possession of twenty (20) years before a party could acquire a real property right. 
Idaho Code§ 5-210 provides: 
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possession 
be considered established under the provisions of any sections of 
this code unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied 
and claimed for the period of twenty (20) years continuously, and 
the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all 
the taxes, state, county or municipal, which have been levied and 
assessed upon such land according to law. 
Prior to 2006, the prescriptive period under Idaho Code § 5-210 was only five years. 
Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 158, pp. 474-76 (2006). The pre-2006 amendment version of the statute 
unambiguously indicated that adverse possession would "in no case . . . be considered 
established" until the claimant occupied the property for five years. Id. The right is not 
"established" until that point. Because Appellants had not occupied the Property for the full five 
year period as of July 1, 2006, Appellants had not established a right by adverse possession as of 
that date. 
Effective July 1, 2006, the Idaho Legislature amended § 5-210 to lengthen the 
prescriptive period from 5 to 20 years. Id Idaho Code § 67-510 provides that a new act takes 
effect on the later of July 1 of the year of the regular session of the Legislature in which the act 
was passed, or sixty (60) days from the end of the session. Since the Idaho Legislature 
adjourned on April 11, 2006 (see generally 2006 Idaho Session Laws), the amendment of§ 5-
210 was effective July 1, 2006. 
Appellants argue the amendment to § 5-210 effective July 1, 2006, does not apply to their 
cause of action since they began adversely possessing the Property prior to July 1, 2006. 
(1972) (discussing different applicability of§ 5-203 and § 5-210). But, the error was harmless as both § 5-203 and § 
5-210 were amended effective July I, 2006, to extend the time period to establish ownership by adverse possession 
( or bar an owner from ejecting an adverse possessor) from 5 to 20 years. 
4 
Appellants argue they acquired a right in the Property on the date they began adversely 
possessing the Property. (See Appellants' Brief, p. 10 ("The [District] Court erred, however, in 
concluding that the maturity date of an adverse possession claim--rather than the commencement 
date of the actions constituting adverse possession--was the triggering event that determined the 
applicable limitations period.").) Appellants are wrong. A party does not establish or acquire a 
right in real property by adverse possession until such party has adversely possessed the property 
for the period of time prescribed by Idaho Code on the date the time period is completed (not the 
date the time period begins). See Pleasants v. Henry, 36 Idaho 728,735,213 P. 565,567 (1923) 
(noting party acquires right of ownership by adverse possession after possessing the property for 
the entire time prescribed by statute). Since Appellants had not adversely possessed the Property 
the entire period prescribed by the statute in effect prior to July I, 2006, they did not acquire any 
ownership rights before the effective date of the amendment. 
Appellants acknowledge they only adversely possessed the disputed strip of land for 
approximately 14 years when they filed the quiet title action and claimed a right to the Property 
by adverse possession. (R. Vol I, p. 8.) This is six years short of the statutory period. 
At the time the Idaho Legislature effectively amended § 5-210, Appellants did not have a 
vested right in the Property by adverse possession. Appellants' Complaint and Petition to Quiet 
Title alleges that they fenced off the disputed strip of land and began treating it as their own 
property after November 11, 2001. (Id.). By their own admission, therefore, Appellants took 
possession of the disputed strip approximately 4 Y, years before the amendment of Idaho Code § 
5-210. 
In July 2006, the Idaho Legislature extended the time period to establish a right by 
adverse possession to 20 years. In this situation (where a time period to acquire a right is 
5 
extended before the rig/it is acquired), a party must meet the new statutory time period to 
acquire the right, but is given credit for any time that has passed prior to the effective date of the 
newly amended statute. See Idaho Code§ 73-107. 
When a limitation or period of time prescribed in any existing 
statute for acquiring a right, or barring a remedy, or for any other 
purpose, has begun to run before these compiled laws go into 
effect, and the same or any limitation is prescribed in these 
compiled laws, the time which has already run shall be deemed 
part of the time herein prescribed as such limitation. 
On July 1, 2006, Idaho Code§ 5-210 was effectively amended to require a period of 20 
years of adverse possession before a party acquired a right by adverse possession. As a matter of 
law, as of July 1, 2006, Appellants had not acquired a right in the Property. Under the clear and 
unambiguous language of Idaho Code§ 73-107, the new period to acquire the property right by 
adverse possession was applicable to Appellants, who were entitled to credit for the time that had 
already run on the period of time to acquire a right by adverse possession. 
Since Appellants did not have a ripe claim for adverse possession as of July 1, 2006, they 
must meet the adverse possession requirements under the amended statute. Appellants are 
required to adversely possess the Property for 20 years before their property rights vested and 
they could bring a ripened claim for adverse possession. Had they continuously possessed the 
disputed strip for the five-year prescriptive period before July 1, 2006, they might argue with 
some force that their title had matured. See Idaho Code § 73-115 (providing that the repeal or 
abrogation of a statute does not affect "any right already existing or accrued."); see also Capstar 
Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 420, 283 P.3d 728, 737 (2012) n. 2 
(addressing the amendment to Idaho Code § 5-203 and noting that "the twenty year time period 
does not apply to an easement by prescription acquired prior to the amendment.") (emphasis 
added). Appellants did not obtain grandfather rights under the five-year version of Idaho Code § 
6 
5-210 because they had not possessed the strip for five years before the new prescriptive period 
of 20 years came into effect. 
Even counting the time during which Appellants allegedly possessed the disputed strip of 
land before July 1, 2006, they failed to meet the 20-year prescriptive period. The District Court 
correctly found Appellants' Complaint and Petition for Quiet Title fatally defective on its face 
and properly dismissed the Complaint and Petition for Quiet Title with prejudice pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 2(b )( 6). 
2. The Amendment to § 5-210 Effective July 1, 2006, Is Not Being Applied 
Retroactively to Appellants. 
On July 1, 2006, Appellants could not have filed a quiet title action seeking a judgment 
they had taken title to the Property by adverse possession. A statute may only be said to be 
"retroactive only when it operates upon transactions which have been completed or upon rights 
which have been acquired ... prior to its passage." Frisbie v. Sunshine Mining Co., 93 Idaho 
169,172,457 P.2d 408,411 (1969) (emphasis added); see also City of Garden City v. City of 
Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 515, 660 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1983) ("it also is the rule in Idaho that 
retroactive legislation is only that which affects vested or already existing rights.") (citing 
Hidden Springs Trout Ranch, Inc. v. Allred, 102 Idaho 623,624,636 P.2d 745, 746 (1981), and 
Buckalew v. City of Grangeville, 100 Idaho 460, 600 P.2d 136 (1979) (emphasis added)). 
Appellants had no vested property rights in the subject property as of July 1, 2006. The District 
Court did not retroactively apply the July 1, 2006, amendment to § 5-210. 
Appellants' claim for adverse possession of the subject property had not accrued as of 
July 1, 2006. Appellants had not acquired any property rights at that time and could not have 
maintained a quiet title action with respect to the Property. "[U]nder Idaho law, a cause of action 
generally accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when a party may maintain a 
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lawsuit against another." Western Corp. v. Vanek, 144 Idaho 150, 151, 158 P.3d 313,314 (2006) 
(citing Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912,915,655 P.2d 119, 122 (Ct. App. 1982)). 
Appellants likewise could not have asserted their adverse possession as a defense to any 
ejectment or trespass action brought by the true owners of the Property. A party asserting a 
property right by adverse possession may wield that right as a sword or a shield. But, the right is 
not fully vested until the statutory time period has been met. Until that time, the adverse 
possessor has no legal rights to the property. Only after a party adversely possesses the property 
for the full statutory period will the right become fully vested. An amended statute may not be 
applied retroactively to fully vested rights. See Ford v. City of Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 509, 321 
P.2d 589, 594 (1958) ("A statute affecting vested rights will be construed as operating 
prospectively only, and not retrospectively. A right or defense, not technical, but substantial, 
resulting in immunity from liability, which has fully vested, is as sacred and as important as a 
right of action, and is protected from any retroactive legislation in like manner as a vested right 
of action.") (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Appellants' right of 
ownership by adverse possession did not vest prior to July I, 2006. 
The District Court's determination that Appellants' adverse possession cause of action 
would be governed by the version of§ 5-210 effective as of July I, 2006, is also consistent with 
Idaho law concerning the extension of time to bring a cause of action. Prior to July I, 2006, the 
owners of the Property had five years from the commencement of Appellants' adverse 
possession of the Property to bring an ejectment action. As of July I, 2006, that ejectment action 
was not barred by the previous limitation period, as Appellants had only adversely possessed the 
Property for a little over four and a half years. The 2006 amendment to § 5-203 extended the 
time the owners of the Property could bring an ejectrnent action against Appellants from 5 to 20 
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years. It would not be a retrospective application of the newly enacted § 5-203 to allow the 
Property owners to bring an ejectment action within 20 years of the date Appellants commenced 
adversely possessing the Property. "[I]t is generally and rather consistently held by most courts 
that statutes enlarging the period of limitations apply to existing causes of action that had not 
been barred by the previous limitation. It is held that such statutes are not retrospective in 
application but are merely an extension of the right to bring the action." Kindred v. 
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 290, 756 P.2d 401, 407 (1988); see also Maplevale 
Builders, LLC & a. v. Town of Danville, 165 N.H. 99, 108, 70 A.3d 427,434 (N.H. 2013) ("The 
right to rely upon a statute of limitations as a defense vests, and therefore becomes a substantive 
right, only after the limitations period has run."); United States v. Kurzenknabe, 136 F. Supp. 17, 
23 (D.N.J. 1955) ("There is nothing 'retroactive' about the application of an extension of a 
statute oflimitations, so long as the original statutory period has not yet expired."). 
It is not a retroactive application of§ 5-210 as amended in 2006 to require Appellants to 
adversely possess the Property for 20 years in order to establish a right of ownership in the 
Property by adverse possession. Likewise, it would not be a retroactive application of§ 5-203 to 
allow Respondent to proceed with an ejectment action against Appellants before the 20-year 
limitations period in§ 5-203 expires.3 
3. Appellants' Reliance on an Antiquated South Carolina Case Is Misplaced. 
In support of their argument that the five-year limitation period should be applied, 
Appellants cite to a South Carolina case that is over 125 years old. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 9-10.) 
Lyles v. Roach, 30 S.Car. 291, 9 S.E. 334 (S.C. 1889), is distinguishable on its facts, is no longer 
3 An ejectment action was an action recognized by the common law. See Burke v. McDonald, 2 Hasb. 339,359 
(Idaho 1887), Broderick, J., concurring (acknowledging common law action for ejection). The extension of any 
accrued right to eject Appellants from the Property would not be considered a substantive change, but a remedial 
change that would apply to any ejectment action that accrued prior to the July I, 2006, statutory amendment. See 
Kindred at 290, 756 P.2d at 407. 
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good law even in South Carolina, and certainly is not applicable to Idaho. In the South Carolina 
Roach case, the facts were just the converse of the present case. In Roach, the parties claiming 
adverse possession alleged they took possession of the land in question in 1872. At that time the 
statutory period for adverse possession under South Carolina law was 20 years. In 1873, the 
South Carolina General Assembly changed the statutory period to 10 years. Suit was filed in 
1884. Thus, the case involved a situation where the statute of limitation was shortened, not 
lengthened. The Roach court held that, assuming the claimants took possession while the old 
law was still in effect, the longer statutory period in effect prior to 1873 applied, thus barring the 
claim for adverse possession. 
The holding of Roach was later distinguished or flatly repudiated by the federal courts, 
applying South Carolina law. For example, in Cannon v. Johnson, Lane, Space, Smith & 
Company, Inc., 460 F.Supp. 724 (D.S.C. 1978), the defendants were sued for alleged violations 
of the South Carolina blue-sky laws. At the time the alleged securities violations took place, the 
applicable period of limitation was two years. After the date of commission of the allegedly 
wrongful acts but before suit was filed, this statute was amended to extend the limitation period 
to three years. 4 The defendants contended that the proper limitation period is that which was in 
effect when the cause of action arose; i.e., two years, and that the two-year statute of limitation 
was a bar to recovery. Id. at 725. Holding that the defendants had no vested right in the shorter 
limitation period, the Court rejected the defendants' contention: 
Strictly speaking, a statute of limitations when applicable is not a 
defense to an action, but when pleaded, which it must be in order 
for a defendant to benefit therefrom, is a bar to the action. A 
limitations statue is a statute of grace, permitting the avoidance and 
4 Note that this fact pattern is consonant with that of the present case. The five-year version of Idaho Code§ 5-210 
was in effect at the time the plaintiffs first encroached on their neighbor's land, but the statute was amended before 
the complaint was filed. 
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evasion of the liability; and while given recognition when pleaded, 
it has never been favored by the courts. If there is any doubt as to 
which of two statutes applies, that doubt must be resolved in favor 
of the longest period, according to the great weight of authority. 
Id. at 728 (citation omitted). 
The Cannon court noted that, whether statutes of limitation are deemed to be applied 
prospectively of retroactively, the federal courts generally adhere to the rule than an amendment 
lengthening a statute of limitations may properly be applied to causes of action which are viable 
at the time of the effective date of the amendment. Id. "This rule does not stand for the 
proposition that a cause of action can be revived by a statute passed after the limitation period 
has expired. 5 It merely stands for the proposition that amendments extending statutes of 
limitations apply to pre-existing claims not already barred at the time the amended statute of 
limitations was passed." Id. 
4. The District Court Correctly Applied Idaho Code§ 73-107. 
Appellants concede that, "a claim to title by adverse possession 'matures' only after the 
full statutory period has run." (Appellants' Brief, p. 10.) Another way to saying this would be 
that a party does not acquire rights by adverse possession until the full statutory period has run. 
See Otter Creek Reservoir Co. v. New Escalante Irr. Co., 203 P.3d 1015, 1019 (Utah 2009) 
("Adverse use rights are not 'acquired' when the adverse use begin; rather adverse use rights are 
acquired after seven years of continuous use."). 
Idaho Code§ 5-210 sets the time period for an adverse possessor to establish or acquire 
ownership rights by adverse possession. See Deer Creek, Inc. at 534, 493 P .2d at 393 ("LC. §§ 
5-209 and 210 ... set forth prerequisites to a claim of adverse possession."). The amendment to 
' Again, this is consonant with Idaho law. See Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 420, 28
3 
P.3d 728, 737(2012) n. 2: "the twenty year time period does not apply to an easement by prescription acquired 
prior to the amendment." (Emphasis added.) 
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§ 5-210 effective July 1, 2006, changed the period of time in the existing statute to acquire a 
right by adverse possession. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 73-107, "[w]hen a ... period of time 
prescribed in any existing statute for acquiring a right ... has begun to run before [the amended 
statute] go[es] into effect, and the same or any limitation is prescribed in [the amended statute] 
the time which has already run shall be deemed part of the time herein prescribed as such 
limitation." 
The District Court correctly applied the unambiguous language of § 73-107 to the 
amendment to§ 5-210 and§ 5-203 and held the amended statutes applied to Appellants' adverse 
possession claim, but Appellants would be entitled to credit for any time that had run prior to the 
effective dates of§ 5-210 and§ 5-203 as amended. (R. Vol I, p. 81.) 
Appellants cite to a Wisconsin case, Petropoulos v. City of West Allis, 436 N.W.2d 880 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989), in support of the contention that adverse possession rights accrue at the 
time possession commences. (See Appellants' Brief, pp. 8-9 (implying Petropoulos holding 
stands for proposition that adverse possession rights accrue when possession commences).) 
Appellants overlook a substantial difference in how Idaho and Wisconsin have chosen to 
legislatively handle amendments to time limits for bringing actions and acquiring rights. 
Both Idaho and Wisconsin have statutes that govern the repeal or change in law limiting 
time for bringing actions. Compare Idaho Code § 73-107 to W.S.A. § 990.06. But, the two 
statutes are different. Unlike Idaho's statute concerning the limitations period in situations 
where the limitations period is changed, Wisconsin's statute does not provide for any credit for 
time that has already run. (W.S.A. § 990.06.) 
The Wisconsin statute provides that the repealed statute shall remain in force and apply to 
all limitations and periods of time that previously began to run. Id. ("the act repealed shall be 
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held to continue and be operative to determine all such limitations and periods of time which 
shall previously begun to run unless such repealing act shall otherwise expressly provide."). 
Idaho's statute contains no such legislative direction and indicates that the new statutory 
limitation period shall be used in all cases, with credit provided for time that elapsed prior to the 
effective date of the new statute. Idaho Code§ 73-107. 
The Idaho Legislature could have enacted a scheme similar to Wisconsin for dealing with 
changes in periods of limitations and could have, like Wisconsin, chosen to have the limitations 
periods under repealed statutes continue in force and effect in certain circumstances. Idaho 
chose to adopt a different rule, which provides for credit for time that has passed but requires a 
party to adhere to the revised limitations period. The District Court correctly applied § 73-107. 
5. The 20-Year Limitation of I.C. § 5-210 Applies to Appellants' Non-Ripened 
Claim for Adverse Possession. 
Appellants had not attained a vested right in the Property at the time the statute was 
amended. Therefore, Appellants' adverse possession claim is governed by§ 5-210, as amended 
effective July 1, 2006. An amendment altering the Idaho statute oflimitation applies to causes of 
action that have not matured into vested rights at the time of amendment. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has never ruled on whether an amendment to the adverse 
possession statutes would apply retroactively to a right that vested prior to the effective date of 
the amendment. New York's highest court addressed this issue on several occasions recently 
and held that the amended statute would not apply to cases where the property right vested 
before the effective date of the amendment, even if the lawsuit was filed after the effective date. 
See Pritsiolas v. Apple Bankcorp, Inc., 120 A.O. 3d 647, 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (holding 
amended statute "does not apply where, as in this case, the property interest is alleged to have 
vested by adverse possession prior to the enactment of the statute"); see also 5262 Kings Hwy, 
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LLC v. Nadia Dev., LLC, 121 A.D. 3d 748, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (holding law in effect 
when property right by adverse possession vested applied); Reyes v. Carroll, 137 A.D. 3d 886, 
887-88 (N.Y. App. Div 2016) (applying post 2008 amended statute to adverse possession claim 
that "did not vest prior to the enactment of the statute"). This Court previously signaled it would 
hold similarly. See Capstar at 420, n. 2, 283 P.3d at 737, n. 2 (holding the amendment to § 5-
203 in 2006, "does not apply to an easement acquired prior to the amendment"). By extension, 
the 2006 amendments to § 5-203 and § 5-210 do apply to adverse property or prescriptive rights 
acquired after the effective date of the amendments to the statutes. 
A holding that Appellants' cause of action did not accrue before it acquired a vested right 
in the Property (which did not happen before July 1, 2006) and that the 20-year period of adverse 
possession set forth in the amended, post-2006 version of§ 5-210 applies to Appellants' claim of 
ownership in the Property by adverse possession would be consistent with this Court's holdings 
in similar situations. For example, in Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 641, 550 P.2d 259 (1976), this 
court held that a limitation period prescribed by a new statute is applicable from the effective 
date of its enactment. In that case, a doctor who performed surgery left a needle in the patient's 
body, which was later discovered and removed. The patient brought suit 17 months after 
discovery of the needle. At the time of the original surgery, the statute of limitation for medical 
malpractice was two years from the date of the wrong or from notice, actual or implied, of the 
presence of a foreign object in the patient's body. However, in 1971, after the date of the 
original surgery but before discovery of the needle, the statute was amended to provide that the 
statute of limitation was two years from the date of the wrong or one year from the date of 
discovery of the foreign body. Thus, the statute was shortened insofar as it applied to the 
discovery of a foreign body. 
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The issue in Stoner, as framed by this Court, was the time of accrual of the patient's 
cause of action. If the cause of action accrued after the effective date of the amendment, then the 
patient's cause of action would be barred by the one-year limitation period. On the other hand, if 
the cause of action accrued before the amendment of the statute of limitation, the patient's 
complaint would be timely due to the application of the two-year limitation. The Court in Stoner 
held that, "The statute of limitation in effect when the right of action is deemed to accrue defines 
the statutory period unless the legislature provides otherwise." Id. at 643, 550 P.2d at 261. The 
cause of action was deemed to accrue, and the statute of limitation began to run, when the needle 
was discovered within the patient's body. At that point in time, the new one-year statute of 
limitation had been enacted and was in effect. Since the complaint was not filed until more than 
one year thereafter, the complaint was barred. 
A similar result is mandated in the present case. Appellants' cause of action did not 
accrue until they occupied the disputed strip of land for the full statutory period. 
All the authorities agree that, in order to bar the true owner 
of land from recovering it from an occupant in adverse possession 
and claiming ownership through the operation of the statute of 
limitation, the possession must have been, for tlie wliole period 
prescribed by tlie statute, actual, open, visible, notorious, 
continuous, and hostile to the true owner's title and to the world at 
large. 
Pleasants, 36 Idaho at 735,213 P. at 567 (emphasis added). 
Prior to the expiration of the whole period prescribed by the statute, Appellants possessed 
no cause of action and could not bring a complaint. Since they had not occupied the disputed 
land for the statutory period before July 1, 2006, their cause of action could only accrue after the 
effective date of the statutory amendment. As in Stoner, "[t]he statute of limitation in effect 
when the right of action is deemed to accrue defines the statutory period unless the legislature 
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provides otherwise." In other words, the 20-year limitation period that took effect on July I, 
2006, is the applicable period. 
The appellant in Stoner argued that applying the amended statute constituted a retroactive 
application. However, the Idaho Supreme Court held otherwise: 
A law is not retroactive merely because part of the factual situation 
to which it is applied occurred prior to its enactment; rather, a law 
is retroactive only when it operates upon transactions which have 
been completed or upon rights which have been acquired or upon 
obligations which have existed prior to its passage. In cases such as 
the present, the right to compensation does not accrue and the 
rights of the parties do not become fixed until the occurrence of the 
event, in this case appellant's disability, which gives rise to a cause 
of action. 
Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 641,643,550 P.2d 259,261 (1976) (citations and quotations omitted). 
Application of the amended 20-year limitation period of§ 5-210 that became effective on 
July 1, 2006, does not constitute a retroactive amendment because as of July 1, 2006, Appellants' 
claim for adverse possession had not accrued. Appellants could not have maintained a cause of 
action for adverse possession prior to July 1, 2006 (since they had not adversely possessed the 
Property for the full five-year period applicable to claims that vested prior to July 1, 2006). 
Therefore, no vested rights of Appellants were impacted by the extension of the adverse 
possession time requirement from 5 years to 20 years. The District Court did not retroactively 
apply the amendment to § 5-210 effective July I, 2006. 
The same result was reached in University of Utah Hospital v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 
175,657 PJd 469,472 (1983), overruling Cook v. Massey, 36 Idaho 264,220 P. 1088 (1923), 
wherein this Court held that "[t]he limitation prescribed by the new statute commenced when the 
cause of action was first subjected to the operation of the statute." See also Martin v. Clements, 
98 Idaho 906, 575 P.2d 885 (1978) (holding that a cause of action was deemed to accrue at the 
time of the alleged negligent action and, thus, the limitation period in effect at that time applied); 
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Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 913 P.2d 1160 (1996) (holding that a statutory amendment 
changing the limitation period for a petition for post-conviction relief was applicable as of the 
amendment's effective date); State v. 0 'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 796 P.2d 121 (1990) (holding 
where statute of limitation in effect at the time of the commission of the acts with which the 
defendant was charged had not run, extension of the time by the legislature was not a retroactive 
amendment). In O'Neill, the Court pointed out the following: 
As a general proposition, it may be stated that there is no such 
thing as a common law statute of limitation in criminal cases. 
Such statutes of limitation are matters of legislative grace; they are 
a surrendering by the sovereign of its right to prosecute. Since 
they are measures of public policy only, and subject to the will of 
the Legislature as such, they may be changed or repealed in any 
case where the right to a dismissal has not been absolutely 
acquired by the completion of the running of the statutory period 
of limitation. 
State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244,247, 796 P.2d 121, 124 (1990). 
While O'Neill was a criminal case, the same principle is applicable here. Until such time 
as Appellants have acquired a vested right by the complete running of the statute of limitation, 
the legislature can change the limitation period at its pleasure. It did so by extending the period 
for adverse possession from 5 to 20 years. Since Appellants possessed no vested right as of the 
effective date of the amendment, the District Court correctly held the new statutory period of 20 
years applies to Appellants' cause of action for adverse possession. 
Appellants' reliance on Sarfati v. Wood Holly Ass., 874 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1989), is 
misplaced. Sarfati concerned a cause of action that had already accrued. Id. at 1524 ("The sole 
issue before this Court, therefore, is whether Sarfati's claim should be governed by the two-year 
limitations period in effect at the time his cause of action accrued or the three-year period 
enacted by amendment during the time Sarfati' s claims were viable"). Appellants' cause of 
action for adverse possession did not accrue prior to July 1, 2006, and has never accrued. 
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Appellants never established a right under § 5-210 (either before July 1, 2006, or after July 1, 
2006). So, the change to the period of adverse possession required to establish a property right 
did not limit or impact any rights of Appellants. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests the Court find that Appellants' adverse possession 
claim with respect to the Property pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-210 is governed by the version of 
§ 5-210 effective as of July 1, 2006, and that Appellants must meet the 20-year adverse 
possession period in order to obtain title to the Property. Respondent requests this Court hold 
Appellants have not established any rights by adverse possession in the Property. Respondent 
requests that the Court affirm the holding of the District Court. 
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ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
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